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STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal involves the validity of a provision in the Premarital Agreement entered into by
Appellant (Julie) and Respondent (Mark) on March 20, 2012. The provision at issue is found in
subsection 4.8(b) of the Premarital Agreement. Subsection 4.8(a) of the Premarital Agreement
required Julie to apply for a 30 year term life insurance policy in the amount of $2,000,000.00, and
Julie was required to name Mark as the sole beneficiary. Pt. Exhibit 1, p.9. Subsection (b) of 4.8
states: "Wife must keep the policy in force after termination of the marriage unless Wife obtains a
divorce from Husband under Idaho Code Section 32-603(1) through 32-603(7)." Pt. Exhibit 1, p.9.
Julie argued before the Trial Court that subsection 4.8(b) was void against public policy
because Mark had no insurable interest in Julie's life post divorce. The Trial Court agreed with Julie
and found that subsection 4.8(b) was void due to Mark's lack of an insurable interest in Julie's life.
R., p. 282.
Mark appealed the Trial Court's decision and the District Court reversed the Trial Court's
decision finding that the contractual insurance requirement in the agreement was not void to the
extent it applied after the divorce. Also, because the Trial Court's decision awarding Julie attorney
fees was partially based on the Trial Court's finding that the insurance provision was void the
District Court reversed Julie's attorney fee award and remanded that issue back to the Trial Court
for further consideration. R., pp. 389-413. The District Court subsequently amended its decision
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as to the reason for upholding the insurance provision in the parties' Premarital Agreement. Julie
appealed the District Court's opinion, and subsequently filed an amended appeal after the District
Court issued its amended decision.

Course of the Proceedings
Julie filed a Petition for Divorce on May 6, 2016. R., pp. 22-24. There was no dispute
between the parties that they had married on March 26, 2012. R., p. 22, ~ I; R., p. 25, ~ 1. There was
also no dispute that the parties had entered into a Premarital Agreement on March 20, 2012. R., p.
23,

~

V; R., p. 25,

~

2.

Mark filed a Response and Counterclaim to Julie's Petition on May 23, 2016. R., pp. 25-37.
Julie filed a response to Mark's Counterclaim on May, 26, 2016. R., pp. 42-47.
Julie sought and was granted permission to file an Amended Petition for Divorce which was
filed on August 11, 2016. R., pp. 230-232. Mark responded to Julie's filing on August 31, 2016.
R., pp. 239-240.
On October 26, 2016, Julie filed a Motion in Limine seeking a ruling from the Trial Court
that subsection 4.8(b) of the parties' Premarital Agreement be declared void and unenforceable as
a matter oflaw because the section violated Idaho Code §41-1804 which requires that a beneficiary
of a life insurance policy have an insurable interest in the individual insured. R., pp. 267-268; R.,
pp. 269-275.
On November 8, 2016, the Trial Court issued a "Decision Petitioner's Motion In Limine."
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R., pp. 276-284. The Trial Court found as a matter of law that subsection 4.8(b) of the Premarital
Agreement was void because: "Mark would have no insurable interest following divorce. Mark
would have no interest in the life of Julie but would have a direct interest in her death. The insurance
would be a mere wager." R., p. 284.
The divorce case proceeded to trial which was held on November 14-16, 2016. R., p. 290.
On December 8, 2016, the Trial Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Of note
for Julie's appeal are the Trial Court's findings regarding the insurance provision in the parties'
Premarital Agreement. The Trial Court noted that in negotiating the insurance provision of the
Premarital Agreement Mark had stated that a $2,000,000.00 life insurance policy on Julie's life with
Mark being named the sole beneficiary would enable Mark to continue his lifestyle should Julie die
before Mark. R., p.301. The Trial Court found that during the marriage Mark did have an insurable
interest in Julie's life because she was providing him financial support. R., p. 303. Julie paid for
and provided for Mark's lifestyle and it was in Mark's interest that Julie continue to live. Id. Post
divorce Julie was not going to provide any financial support to Mark and he no longer had a financial
interest in Julie continuing to live. Mark's interest post divorce was that Julie would pass away and
Mark would receive a windfall of $2,000,000.00. Id. "His interest is not in her life but in her death.
The insurance policy has become a wager on Julie's death." Id.
On December 8, 2016 the Trial Court entered a Judgment and Decree of Divorce. R., pp.
305-306. The Judgment declared the life insurance provision in subsection 4.8(b) of the Premarital
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Agreement void as a matter of law. R., p. 306, ~ 13.
On January 18, 2017, Mark filed a Notice of Appeal. R., pp. 307-310. One of the issues
Mark appealed was the Trial Court's decision regarding the life insurance provision. R., p. 309, ~
13.
On January 26, 2017, the Trial Court entered an Amended Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
R., pp. 311-312. The Amended Decree found subsection 4.8 of the Premarital Agreement void. R.,

p. 312, ~ 13.
On February 7, 2012, the Trial Court issued a decision regarding attorney fees and awarded
Julie $50,000.00 in attorney fees. R., pp. 314-315; R., pp. 316-321. The Trial Court found that Julie
was the prevailing party and pursuant to section 22 of the Premarital Agreement Julie was entitled
to fees and costs in the amount of $50,000.00. R., pp. 320-321. Section 22 of the Premarital
Agreement states: "If a party reasonably retains counsel for the purposes of enforcing or preventing
the breach of any provision of this Agreement, for damages by reason of any alleged breach of any
provision of it, for a declaration of his or her rights or obligations under it or for any other judicial
remedy, then, if the matter is settled by judicial determination or arbitration, the prevailing party,
whether at trial or appeal, may, in addition to the other relief granted, be reimbursed by the losing
party for any cost or expense incurred, including, without limitation, any reasonable, itemized, and
documented attorney's fees and costs for the services rendered to the prevailing party." Pt. Exhibit
1, § 22.
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On February 21, 201 7, Mark filed an Amended Notice of Appeal listing the issues as: " ... all
matters outlined in Notice of Appeal along with other frauds in this case and the motion for recusal
that was denied". R., p. 351,

~

1.

On May 28, 2019, the District Court issued it's Opinion. R., pp. 389-413. The District Court
ruled that the insurance provision was not void and it was enforceable. The District Court reasoned
that Julie had voluntarily entered into the Premarital Agreement and at the time of the parties'
marriage Mark did have an insurable interest in Julie's life. The District Court also reasoned that
since Mark was not paying for the life insurance policy he was not wagering anything on Julie's life.
The District Court reversed the Trial Court's award of attorney fees because part of the Trial Court's
reasons for awarding fees was that Julie had prevailed on the insurance issue therefore the Trial
Court should look at the attorney fee issue again in light of the District Court's decision regarding
the validity of the life insurance section.
On July 8, 2019, Julie filed her Notice of Appeal seeking review of the District Court's
decision regarding the validity of the life insurance provision and the reversal of the Trial Court's
award of attorney fees. R., pp. 414-416. On the same date the District Court issued an Amended
Opinion. R., pp. 417-440. The District Court continued to rely on the reasoning that there was not
a wagering on Julie's life because it was Julie who was paying the premium, and the District Court
added additional reasoning using Idaho's Probate Code that provides a will that bequeaths a spouse
assets is automatically revoked by a divorce unless the written bequeath specifically states that the
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bequeath survives a divorce. The District Court reasoned that since the Premarital Agreement
specifically stated that Julie's obligation to provide life insurance on her life with Mark as the
beneficiary survived divorce, the provision was valid pursuant to the Idaho Probate Code. R., pp.
426-431.
On August 1, 2019, Julie filed her Amended Notice of Appeal appealing the District Court's
Amended Opinion. R., pp. 441-444.
Facts

Julie and Mark entered into a Premarital Agreement on March 20, 2012. Subsection 4.8(a)
of the Premarital Agreement required Julie to apply for and if her application was accepted pay for
a life insurance policy on her life in the amount of $2,000,000.00 for a term of 30 years. Mark was
to be named as the sole beneficiary of this policy. Mark stated in writing the reason for this
provision was to maintain his standard ofliving in the event that Julie were to pass away before he
did. Mark earned very little income during the parties' marriage, and Julie and Mark were supported
by approximately $1,200,000.00 that Julie received from a family trust during the marriage. R., p.
294, first paragraph under the section heading of FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM TRIAL.
Subsection 4.8(b) of the Premarital Agreement required Julie to keep the life insurance policy
in force after the parties were divorced unless Julie obtained a divorce from Mark under certain
sections ofldaho Code regarding fault. In her Amended Petition for Divorce Julie alleged that she
should be granted a divorce from Mark due to extreme cruelty or habitual intemperance. R., p. 231,
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~

III.
Julie and Mark were married on March 26, 2012. R., p. 294. They separated on April 29,

2016. Id. They have no children in common. Id. Mark was awarded no interest in the real property
that was owned by Julie's family trust. R., p. 311, 15. Mark was to receive no spousal support from
Julie. R., p. 312, 18.
The insurance provision requiring Julie to maintain the life insurance policy on her life with
Mark as the sole beneficiary was declared void by the Trial Court. The Trial Court found that Julie
was the prevailing party in the case and pursuant to section 22 of the Premarital Agreement Julie was
entitled to $50,000.00 in fees and costs. The District Court reversed the Trial Court's decision
regarding the life insurance policy being void, and remanded the attorney fee award back to the Trial
Court for reconsideration based on the District Court's ruling that the life insurance policy section
was valid.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court commit error in finding that subsection 4. 8(b) of the parties'

Premarital Agreement was valid and enforceable even though after the parties' divorce Mark had no
insurable interest in Julie's life; and
2.

If the District Court committed error in finding subsection 4.8(b) was valid and

enforceable then it also committed error in reversing the Trial Court's award of attorney fees.
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Julie should be awarded her fees and costs in this appeal pursuant to section 22 of the parties'
Premarital Agreement.
ARGUMENT
Legal Standards
The liberty of contract is not an absolute and unlimited right, but upon the contrary is always
subservient to the public welfare. The courts will not hesitate to declare void as against public policy
contractual provisions which clearly tend to the injury of the public in some way. The usual test
applied by courts in determining whether a contract offends public policy and is antagonistic to the
public interest is whether the contract has a tendency toward such an evil. Public policy may be
found and set forth in statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution. Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co. , 150 Idaho 619,623,249 P.3d 812, 816 (2011).

Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine
from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,566, 944 P.2d
695, 701 (1977).
A contract which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by
statute is void. Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552,564,261 P.3d. 829, 841 (2011).
Idaho Code section 41-1804(1) states that no person shall procure or cause to be procured
any insurance contract upon the life of another person unless the beneficiary has an insurable interest
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at the time the contract was made. Under Section 41-1804, an insurable interest exists in the case
of another person where there is:
a lawful and substantial economic interest in having the life, health, or bodily safety of the
individual insured continue, as distinguished from an interest which would arise only by, or
would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement, or injury of the individual insured
§ 41-1804(3)(b).
With respect to property insurance Idaho Code makes it clear that the beneficiary of the
policy must have an interest in the property at the time of loss. I.C. §41-1806 (1 ).
The .Purpo e of the Insurable Interest Rule

In Rhead v. Hartford Ins. Co. this Court explained the insurable interest requirement:
The purpose of the insurable interest doctrine is to prevent parties from insuring wagering
or gambling ... [the] [r]equirement of an insurable interest in insured property is for the
purpose of preventing use of insurance as a means of wagering, since one who has no
protectable interest in the insured project is not allowed to gamble on the possibility of its
destruction.
135 Idaho 446,450, 19 P.3d 760, 764 (2001) quoting Nelson v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 263
F.2d 586 (9 th Circ. 1959).
Common law and courts in other jurisdictions similarly stress the necessity that a beneficiary
have an insurable interest in the insured.
In Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co., the Missouri Supreme Court explained the rationale
behind the insurable interest doctrine as follows:
It has uniformly been held that "A person cannot take out a valid and enforceable policy of

insurance for his own benefit on the life of a person in which he has no insurable interest;
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such a policy or contract of insurance is void and unenforceable on the grounds of public
policy, it being merely a wagering contract..." It has repeatedly been stated that for one to
have an insurable interest in the life of another, "there must be a reasonable ground founded
upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to
expect some benefit from or advantage from the continuance of the life of the insured."
Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542,549 (Mo. 1958) (internal citations omitted).

In Liss v Liss the Florida Court of Appeals addressed issues that are similar to those that are
before this Court. Liss v. Liss, 93 7 So.2d 760 (Fla. App. 2006). In Liss the former husband claimed
that a provision in the parties' property settlement agreement (which was incorporated into the
parties' divorce decree) that allowed the former wife to have a policy on his life was no longer
enforceable because the ex wife no longer had an insurable interest in his life. Liss, 93 7 So.2d at
761-762. The former wife contended that she had an insurable interest at the time of the making of
the agreement and once the settlement agreement was granted it became vested. Id. The lower court
ordered the former husband to sign documents needed to prevent the termination of the life insurance
policy on former husband's life because the settlement agreement had recognized the former wife's
insurable interest and the agreement was not modifiable. Liss, 937 So.2d at 763. The Florida Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court.
The Florida Court of Appeals first noted that the purpose of the provision was "directly tied
to his responsibility to provide for his children and the former spouse." Liss, 937 So.2d at 763. The
Court then went on to note that to accept the former wife's interpretation would create "a situation
where she has a greater interest in a windfall she would enjoy at his demise than her interest in his
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continued life." Liss, 937 So.2d at 764. Florida law required an insurable interest in any individual
contracting for insurance on the life of another. Id. "The obvious purpose of that requirement is to
prevent so-called wagering contracts. It is assumed that the existence of such an insurable interest
will counterbalance any temptation that might otherwise exist for a beneficiary to murder the insured
for insurance proceeds." Id.

The Florida Court also noted that at least one state had held the

insurable interest requirement extends beyond the inception of the agreement and extends during the
duration of the coverage. Liss, 937 So.2d at 765. The concurring opinion in Liss noted that Florida's
statutes regarding the insurance of property required that the beneficiary have an insurable interest
at the time of the loss. Liss, 937 So.2d at 766. The Appellate Court reversed the lower court and
remanded the case back to that court to hold a trial.
The case cited by the Trial Court in its decision, Browning v. Browning is instructive and
persuasive regarding the issue of whether the insurable interest requirement applies beyond the initial
application of the policy. Browning v. Browning, 366 S.C. 255,621 S.E.2d 389 (S.C. App. 2005).
Husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement that was merged into their decree.
Both husband and wife were allowed to take out a life insurance policy on the other party's life.
Browning, 621 S.E.2d at 400. At the time of the making of the agreement wife had an insurable
interest in husband's life. Id. The Appellate Court noted that once the husband's alimony obligation
ended so did wife's insurable interest in husband's life. Browning, 621 S.E.2d at 400-401. The
Appellate Court rejected the wife's claim that husband consented to a perpetual insurable interest
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by entering into the agreement. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court in Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. explained the
insurable interest doctrine as follows:
Bluntly expressed, insurable interest. .. is determined by monetary considerations, viewed
from the standpoint of the beneficiary. Would he regard himself as better off from the
standpoint of money, would he enjoy more substantial economic returns should the insured
continue to live; or would he have more, in the form of the proceeds of the policy, should she
die? Therefore it is said that if the situation is such that he might be led to conclude that he
would profit by her death, the policy contract is void as to him since the public has a
controlling concern that no person have an interest in the early death of another, an interest
that may give rise to a temptation to destroy her life.
Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 139 Tex. l 01, 104-05 (Tex. 1942) (superseded by statute

in part).
In Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co., the Missouri Supreme Court explained the rationale
behind the insurable interest doctrine as follows:
It has uniformly been held that "A person cannot take out a valid and enforceable policy of
insurance for his own benefit on the life of a person in which he has no insurable interest;
such a policy or contract of insurance is void and unenforceable on the grounds of public
policy, it being merely a wagering contract..." It has repeatedly been stated that for one to
have an insurable interest in the life of another, "there must be a reasonable ground founded
upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to
expect some benefit from or advantage from the continuance of the life of the insured."

Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542,549 (Mo. 1958) (internal citations omitted).

The District Court Committed Error
In reversing the Trial Court's decision the District Court first found that Mark is not wagering
anything because he does not have to pay the life insurance premiums. R., p. 427. What the District
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Court does not discuss is that even though Mark is not paying anything for the policy he is forcing
Julie to make those payments via the Premarital Agreement. Therefore, there is a wager on Julie's
life, and she is the one being forced to pay for the wager that benefits only Mark.
The District Court then reasoned that Julie has the right to insure her life and name anyone
she wants to as a beneficiary. R., p. 428. What the District Court did not address is the fact that
Julie no longer is voluntarily maintaining this policy. She is maintaining it because the contract
requires her to maintain it. The District Court did not address the fact that it was Mark who was
causing Julie to procure the insurance policy post divorce. This is in violation ofldaho Code §411804(1) because Mark no longer has an insurable interest in Julie's life.
The District Court reasoned that Mark and Julie's divorce did not destroy the validity of the
life insurance policy. No one is arguing that if Julie voluntarily wanted to maintain the policy on her
life for the benefit of Mark she could do so and the policy would be valid. The issue here is that
Julie no longer wants to maintain that policy, and that is why insurable interest post divorce is of
import.
The final reason the District Court used to overturn the Trial Court was the Idaho Probate
Code. The District Court noted that normally a divorce revokes any revocable disposition of
property made by a divorced individual unless the express terms of a martial contract states that the
beneficiary designation survives a divorce. R., pp. 430-431. The District Court then determined
since the Premarital Agreement in this case provided for the survival of the insurance policy
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requirement post divorce it was valid and did not violate public policy. It is true that Idaho Code
§ 15-2-804(b) establishes an automatic revocation of any revocable disposition of property made by
a divorced individual to their former spouse unless the express terms of a marriage contract state
otherwise. However, this statute is not germane to the question at hand, and it does not establish
public policy that maintaining a life insurance policy without an insurable interest on the life of a
former spouse is valid. A divorced individual may agree that disposition of property survive a
divorce but that does not mean they are forced to keep their former spouse as a beneficiary on their
life insurance policy unless they want the former spouse to remain as the beneficiary.
The Trial Court's Decision was Correct
The purpose of the requirement of having an insurable interest in one who is procuring or
causing to procure a life insurance policy on another's life is to prevent wagering on that person's
life. Although Mark had an insurable interest in Julie's life at the time of the marriage, he no longer
has an insurable interest in her life. Julie does not want to maintain a policy on her life for the
benefit of Mark when he has no interest in her maintaining her life. That is the point the District
Court did not address and the Trial Court did. As the Trial Court stated, Mark's interest during the
marriage was to see that Julie survived because she was supporting him.

R., p. 303. The

continuation of the life insurance policy does not give Mark what he intended which was to
"continue a similar lifestyle" because the only way Mark can obtain that lifestyle now is through
Julie's death. "His interest is not in her life but in her death." Id. Idaho statutes require the
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beneficiary of a property insurance policy to have an insurable interest in the subject property at the
time of the loss. I.C. §41-1806(1 ). Certainly Idaho cares more about life than it does property.
Requiring Julie to maintain a policy on her life for the benefit of Mark when he no longer has an
insurable interest in her life is a wager. Mark is causing Julie to procure this insurance via the
Premarital Agreement. Julie is no longer maintaining this policy voluntarily she is being forced to
maintain the policy. Subsection 4.8(b) of the Premarital Agreement is no longer valid, and Julie
requests this Court to reverse the District Court's decision and affirm the Trial Court's decision and
reinstate the award of attorney fees because the District Court's decision on fees was based on its
reversal of the decision on the life insurance provisions.
Attorney Fees

Section 22 of the Premarital Agreement provides for the award of fees and costs to the
prevailing party on appeal. Pt. Exhibit 1, § 22. Julie requests this Court award her fees and costs
on appeal if she prevails on the insurance issue.
DATED This

3l

day of December, 2019.

Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
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CERTrFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on thi~I day of December, 2019, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be ser~~on the following as indi cated :

Mark D. Colafranceschi
3330 HWY 55
New Meadows, Idaho 83654
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